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a b s t r a c t 
Distributing loan using group lending method is one of the unique features in microﬁnance, as it utilises 
peer monitoring and dynamic incentive to lower credit risks in extending collateral-free loan to the poor. 
However, many microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) eventually perceive it to be costly and restricting loan 
growth thereby resorted to individual lending method to enhance proﬁtability. On the other hand, village 
banking method was developed to boost outreach and to create self-sustaining village microbanks. We 
thus seek to empirically observe the loan method – eﬃciency relationship and to examine the best loan 
method regionally; focusing on not-for-proﬁt MFIs that are widely regarded as best microﬁnance provider. 
Non-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis with regional meta-frontier approach is used for eﬃciency as- 
sessment of 628 MFIs from 87 countries in 6 regions, followed by Tobit regression. We also investigated 
factors affecting eﬃciencies such as borrowings, total donation, cost per borrower (CPB), portfolio at risk 
(PAR), interest rates, MFI age, regulation status, and legal format. The results support our argument that 
appropriate performance analysis should best be performed on regional basis separately as we ﬁnd dif- 
ferent results for different region. 
Crown Copyright © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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p  1. Introduction 
Over the last few decades, microﬁnance has provided ﬁnan-
cial access to the poor households who would otherwise be left
out of by traditional ﬁnancial infrastructures. Whilst most of these
‘unbankables’ ( Simanowitz & Walter, 2002 ) demand small loans
which are infeasible for mainstream banking industry to serve
given the transaction costs incurred ( Armendariz de Aghion & Mor-
duch, 2005 ), ﬁnancial access is still denied to the rest albeit having
collateral ( Johnston & Morduch, 2008 ). Microﬁnance bridges this
gap by opening ﬁnancial access thereto, generating well-recorded
contribution in poverty alleviation e.g. poverty reduction from 60%
in 1970 to 11.5% in 1996 in Indonesia ( Seibel & Agung, 2006 ), small
businesses spur in many countries e.g. Argentina, Philippine, Kenya
and Senegal ( Robinson, 2001 ), households reconstruction in war-
torn countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina ( Matul & Tsilikounas, 2004 )
and in disaster-torn countries e.g. Sri Lanka ( Becchetti & Castri-
ota, 2011 ). 
As poverty eradication instrument ( van Rooyen, Stewart, & de
Wet, 2012 ), MFIs face dual objectives of reaching out to the∗ Corresponding author. 
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0957-4174/Crown Copyright © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articoorest whilst striving for long term sustenance as viable ﬁnan-
ial institution, i.e. a dual bottom line of outreach and ﬁnancial
ustainability ( Marr, 2003 ). A trade-off is observed herein whereby
utreach is attained at the expense of ﬁnancial sustainability, e.g.
n Hermes and Lensink (2007b), Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters
2011), Olivares-polanco (2005) and Schreiner (2002) , prompting
wo approaches with different focus in microﬁnance: institution-
list approach on sustainability and welfarist approach on out-
each ( Robinson, 2001 ). Alternatively, Simanowitz (2007) suggested
 middle way where trade-off can and should be managed. Perceiv-
ng dual objectives as relative measures, Widiarto and Emrouzne-
ad (2015) thus observed using non-parametric data envelopment
nalysis (DEA) that these objectives can be pursued concurrently
y best-practice MFIs in a region/frontier exercising appropriate
trategy. Likewise, Miyashita (20 0 0) and Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and
orduch (2007) stress on the importance of MFI strategy formula-
ion and credit design to manage this trade-off. 
One central strategy is an appropriate lending methodology.
he reluctance of mainstream ﬁnancial institutions to ﬁnance the
oor is due to ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard
 Hermes & Lensink, 2007a ). Grameen Bank Bangladesh thus pio-
eered an innovative group lending scheme that mitigates these
isks through joint liability; borrowers voluntarily form a small
roup whose members are jointly liable for each other’s loan
nd are barred from future loans in the case of non-repaymentle under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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b Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999 ), termed as dynamic incentives ( Kono &
akahashi, 2010 ). A mutual and morally binding guarantee in lieu
f collateral exists herein via a peer guarantee mechanism; mem-
ers motivate and monitor each other whilst implant social sanc-
ions to non-compliant ones ( Varian, 1990 ), mitigating information
symmetry thus avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard prob-
em ( Godquin, 2004 ). Members thus have incentive to voluntarily
ssist potential defaulter in loan repayment ( Abdul Rahman, 2007 ).
he theoretical advantages of group lending has been discussed in
epth, e.g. Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), Gomez and
antor (2001), Stiglitz (1990) and Ghatak (2000) . Grameen Bank
ad proven the effectiveness of this method by having 98% repay-
ent rate hence replicated globally ( Anthony, 2005 ). 
However, group lending may arguably induce agency prob-
em that ironically omit the poorest from microcredit access,
.e. excluded in group formation as deemed risky ( Marr, 2003 )
r rejected by MFI loan oﬃcer to avoid delinquency ( Hulme &
osley, 1996 ). Moreover, group meetings and trainings trigger
igher costs that increases interest rates ( Shankar, 2007 ) and
roup mechanism may limit borrowers with growing business
 Madajewicz, 2011 ). Whilst group repayment is theoretically en-
anced by exploiting local information ( Ghatak, 20 0 0 ), empirical
vidences suggest that repayment is enhanced only if social homo-
eneity and personal trust exist between members ( Cassar, Crow-
ey, & Wydick, 2007; Karlan, 2007 ). 
Conversely, Indonesia’s BRI Unit Desa, the biggest MFI in the
orld, takes more commercial approach and employs individual
ending akin to mainstream ﬁnancial institutions ( Helms, 2006 ),
.e. a bilateral loan agreement between an MFI and sole borrower
ased on her creditworthiness that is usually collateral-based
 Dellien, Burnett, Gincherman, & Lynch, 2005 ). However, the risks
erein are not assessed from document scrutiny; instead, ranging
rom visit to applicants’ businesses and homes to loan guarantee
nd character reference from local village committee ( Armendáriz
e Aghion & Morduch, 20 0 0; Churchill, 1999 ). Moreover, guar-
ntor exercises social pressure for timely repayment ( Jaunaux &
enet, 2009 ). Dynamic incentives is also implemented herein to
itigate ex post moral hazard and strategic default, i.e. borrow-
ng without intention to repay the loan ( Hermes & Lensink, 2007a;
ono & Takahashi, 2010 ). Individual lending indeed exhibits lower
ransaction costs with loan structure ﬂexibility sans peer guaran-
ee ( Westley, 2004 ) that accommodates borrowers with growing
usinesses ( Madajewicz, 2011 ), especially in relatively industrial-
zed area and in transition economies ( Armendáriz de Aghion &
orduch, 20 0 0 ). Many group MFIs also offer individual loan to
revent progressing clients from moving to competitors and to
ttract new clients ( Dellien et al., 2005 ), including pioneers e.g.
rameen Bank Bangladesh ( Hermes & Lensink, 2007a ). Some even
hifted completely into individual lending, e.g. BancoSol Bolivia
 Cull et al., 2007 ). Many Latin American non-bank ﬁnancial insti-
utions and banks employ this method ( Servin, Lensink, & van den
erg, 2012 ), as well as MFIs in East Asia ( Cull et al., 2007 ), Mid-
le East ( Abdelkader, Jemaa, & Mekki, 2012 ), and Eastern Europe
 Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 20 0 0 ). 
Nevertheless, attracting better-off clients with individual lend- 
ng is often done at the expense of the poorest, i.e. mission drift
 Armendariz & Szafarz, 2011; Cull et al., 2007 ). Individual lend-
ng tends to have lower outreach as collateral requirements deters
oorest borrowers ( Cull et al., 2007; Hermes et al., 2011 ). Com-
arison between group and individual lending are discussed com-
rehensively in Dellien et al. (2005), Lehner (2009), Madajewicz
2011) , and Giné and Karlan (2014) . 
Separately, The Foundation for International Community As-
istance (FINCA International) in Latin America pioneered village
anking scheme: facilitating access to credits and savings through
ommunity-managed associations established at village level with0–50 members – hence ‘village bank’ ( Westley, 2004 ). It is typ-
cally facilitated by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
hannelling external capital from local commercial banks for sub-
equent ﬁnancing to village bank members, which is tied to mem-
er’s deposit ( Morduch, 1999 ). Akin to group lending, peer pres-
ure mechanism is herein implemented to ensure timely loan
epayment to sponsors warranting continuous capital injections,
hilst it contrarily adopts bylaws, elects president and treasurer,
nd manages its members’ loans and savings independently. It
reserves internal accounts from savings and time gap in inter-
st and principal payment to its sponsors that can further be ex-
ended as extra loans ( Westley, 2004 ). Its ultimate goal is inter-
al capital accumulation to eventually graduate as an autonomous
elf-sustaining ﬁnancial provider in three years ( Morduch, 1999;
baidullah, 2008 ). Village banking has been replicated mainly in
atin America and Africa ( Obaidullah, 2008 ) where it contributed
igniﬁcantly to poverty alleviation effort in Latin America ( Hiatt &
oodworth, 2006 ). It exhibits greater rural focus and lower aver-
ge loan balance than other schemes ( Westley, 2004 ). 
Nevertheless, its transaction costs is higher due to self-
anagement and compulsory attendance at meetings, thus its real
eneﬁt for borrowers lies in savings and non-ﬁnancial services in-
tead of being an eﬃcient credit facilitators; inﬂexible loan struc-
ure and forced saving requirement are also often problematic to
rowing clients ( Westley, 2004 ). Furthermore, its target to become
ndependent in three year time is often delayed due to slow sav-
ngs and growing credit demands ( Morduch, 1999 ). 
Therefore, as all methods are not without setback, which one
s relatively best to pursue dual objectives? Furthermore, is there
 method that performs best in all regions? Empirical evidence is
hereby indispensable considering that different regions face differ-
nt demographics and, from institutional theory perspective, MFIs
ust adapt to the rules and belief systems in their environment
o survive ( Scott, 1995 ). We argue that differences in demograph-
cs may affect appropriate loan method, i.e. concept of best loan
ethod is thereby relative rather than absolute. Consequently, sep-
rate assessment of best method in different regions is more ap-
ropriate than a global one. 
This paper therefore seeks to observe loan method - perfor-
ance relationship. It ﬁrstly assesses MFIs’ eﬃciency as measure
f relative performance toward benchmark MFIs in overall perfor-
ance, ﬁnancial sustainability and outreach in six regions, namely
frica, East Asia and The Paciﬁc (EAP), Eastern Europe and Central
sia (EECA), Latin America and The Caribbean (LAC), Middle East
nd North Africa (MENA), and South Asia (SA) separately, there-
fter examines their relationship to loan methods. Research ques-
ions explored are: (1) whether loan methods have different im-
act to MFIs’ eﬃciency in different regions; (2) whether a method
nd/or combination offering relatively higher overall, ﬁnancial, and
ocial eﬃciency in all regions exist. Herewith, the focus will be on
ot-for-proﬁt MFIs as it is regarded by many as best microﬁnance
rovider, e.g. Dichter (1996) and Haq, Skully, and Pathan (2010) ;
hough extended to those beyond NGOs, i.e. credit union/ coopera-
ives, non-bank ﬁnancial institutions (NBFI), etc. We previously ob-
erved that not-for-proﬁt MFIs showed generally higher eﬃciency
n EAP, MENA and SA regions ( Widiarto & Emrouznejad, 2015 ). 
We propose a non-parametric method of Data Envelopment
nalysis (DEA) to measure relative performance vis-à-vis social, ﬁ-
ancial, and overall eﬃciency of MFI, speciﬁcally a non-oriented
EA meta-frontier approach. The contribution are therefore three
olds, i.e. (1) contributing regional-based evidence to microﬁnance
nd DEA literatures regarding social and ﬁnancial eﬃciency and
heir relationship with loan methods; (2) contributing to litera-
ures in the use of non-oriented DEA in microﬁnance performance
ssessment, which have not been utilised thus far; (3) constructing
asis for policy recommendation to MFIs in different regions. 
280 I. Widiarto et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 82 (2017) 278–290 
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e  The rest of the paper are organised as follow: Section 2 brieﬂy
reviews eﬃciency concept in microﬁnance context, Section 3 out-
lines DEA concept, model and speciﬁcations used with second
stage Tobit regression model. The dataset is explained in Section 4 ,
followed by ﬁrst and second stage results in Sections 5 and
6 , respectively, with conclusion and future research direction in
Section 7 . 
2. Microﬁnance performance measurement and eﬃciency 
2.1. Traditional ﬁnancial ratio 
The most common methodology that has hitherto been used in
MFI performance measurement is traditional ﬁnancial ratios or in-
dicators, akin to that used in the mainstream ﬁnancial institutions
studies. Several sets of ﬁnancial indicators had been prescribed by
groups of multilateral banks, microﬁnance rating agencies, donors,
and voluntary organisations to measure MFI performance ( CGAP,
2003; Jansson, von Stauffenber g, Kenyon, & Barluenga-Badiola,
2003 ) and have been used in studies e.g. in Bhatt and Tang (2001),
Churchill (1999), Khalily (2004), Koveos and Randhawa (2004) , and
Nanayakkara and Iselin (2012) . The exhaustive list of all indicators
prescribed by CGAP can be observed in Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-
Cinca, and Mar Molinero (2007) . 
However, as Balkenhol (2007), Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2007) , and
Fluckiger and Vassiliev (2007) , we argue that ﬁnancial ratios are
not competent at capturing microﬁnance performance dynamics
comprehensively as its social mission differentiates it from main-
stream ﬁnancial institution. Parallel with Bogetoft and Otto (2011) ,
using ﬁnancial ratios is also ambiguous due to partiality problem,
i.e. an MFI can excel in one ratio but fail in others hence the dif-
ﬁculty in overall benchmarking. Assessing MFIs which focus more
on social outreach, such as development/relief NGO, with the same
yardstick with for-proﬁt bank-MFI which has more focus on ﬁnan-
cial performance is not appropriate. Similarly, using outreach in-
dicators as per Rosenberg (2009) as sole benchmark for MFI per-
formance would pose the same problem for more commercially-
focused MFIs. These two objectives cannot be interpreted sepa-
rately as many MFIs combine them differently in their strategy.
These indicators may lead to diﬃculty in objective evaluation if
different indicators representing different MFI objectives sent dif-
ferent messages regarding MFI performance. 
Moreover, MFI sustainability is not always narrowly deﬁned as
proﬁtability for many MFIs; rather, as an ability to sustain long
term operation ( Nanayakkara, 2012 ). Some MFIs achieve sustain-
ability by reaching proﬁtability (e.g. for-proﬁt MFIs such as banks
or rural banks); yet there exist other MFIs, e.g. non-governmental
organisation-based MFI (NGO-MFI), where proﬁtability is not a ma-
jor focus thus achieving sustainability by contribution from donors
or external grants. The latter includes development NGOs provid-
ing microﬁnance services as ways to assist the impoverished com-
munities in disaster and war-torn areas. 
2.2. Microﬁnance and eﬃciency 
Parallel with Balkenhol (2007), Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2007),
Haq et al. (2010), Hassan and Sanchez (2009) , and Widiarto and
Emrouznejad (2015) , we alternatively propose eﬃciency as mea-
surement of MFI performance; more speciﬁcally, relative eﬃciency
as per Farrell (1957) , i.e. the assessment of actual resources util-
isation by an organisation in producing a given quality of out-
puts relative to optimal use of these resources. Given contex-
tual irrelevancy of input price, the focus herein will be on tech-
nical eﬃciency (TE), i.e. utilisation of inputs to produce outputs
relative to best practice organisations with similar characteristics Emrouznejad & Anouze, 2010 ), which is inﬂuenced by manage-
ial practice and operational scale ( Thanassoulis, 2001 ). We hereby
efrain from using eﬃciency ratios as in MicroBanking Bulletin
006 ( Balkenhol, 2007 ) due to said partiality problems with ratios;
ather, we utilise modern eﬃciency approach suitable for multiple-
nputs and multiple-outputs environment so as to cover both dis-
inct aspects of microﬁnance whilst applicable to both for-proﬁt
nd not-for-proﬁt MFIs. One such method is Data Envelopment
nalysis. 
.3. Data envelopment analysis 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric eﬃciency
ssessment method developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes
1978) , expanding single input-output productive eﬃciency con-
ept from Farrell (1957) into eﬃciency assessment of decision-
aking unit (DMU) involving multiple inputs-outputs. DEA utilises
inear programming to construct a piecewise linear production
rontier enveloping all data as reference set or benchmark against
hich each DMU is assessed ( Cook & Zhu, 2005; Emrouzne-
ad & Anouze, 2010 ). TE in DEA is measured as distance of a
MU to its benchmark(s) on the production frontier, thus cre-
ting relative eﬃciency measure for all DMUs ( Emrouznejad &
nouze, 2009; Thanassoulis, 2001 ). From two basic models stated
n Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) ,
EA has since evolved greatly in its models and applications
see Emrouznejad, Parker, & Tavares, 2008 ). Recent developments
ncludes hybrid models incorporating DEA with data mining,
.g. Emrouznejad and Shale (2009), Samoilenko and Osei-Bryson
2010) and Samoilenko and Osei-Bryson (2014) . 
Contrasting with parametric eﬃciency assessment, DEA evalu-
tes eﬃciency without a priori assumption on the distribution and
roduction function ( Cook & Zhu, 2005; Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu,
004 ) therefore applicable where multiple input-output relation-
hip is not directly observable as in the context of microﬁnance.
everal DEA-microﬁnance studies are listed in Appendix A . Relating
o Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, and Mar Molinero (2009) , we ar-
ue that microﬁnance dual objectives can be regarded as a prob-
em of social eﬃciency and ﬁnancial eﬃciency, i.e. how MFIs trans-
orm resources (inputs) to produce outputs related to outreach and
ustainability objectives respectively, in comparison to their best
erforming peers. 
.4. DEA approaches 
There are two main approaches in ﬁnancial institution eval-
ation, i.e. production and intermediation approach which differ
n the role of deposit, i.e. regarded as output in the former or
s input in the latter ( Athanassopoulos, 1997; Fethi & Pasiouras,
010 ). Since many MFIs in our dataset are not collecting de-
osit hence production approach is used to maintain homogene-
ty, as per Fluckiger and Vassiliev (2007), Gutiérrez-Nieto et al.
2007), Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009), Widiarto and Emrouznejad
2015) and Haq et al. (2010) . 
. Methodology 
.1. DEA model – ﬁrst stage analysis 
The basic DEA models are based upon output- and input-
rientated strategy. The former assesses maximum possible radial
utput expansion with constant input, whilst the latter measures
aximum radial input reduction by maintaining constant out-
ut. These are manifest in DEA-microﬁnance studies highlighted in
ppendix A . Yet, we argue that forcing all MFIs to be uniformly
valuated in either orientation is not realistic due to different MFI
I. Widiarto et al. / Expert Systems With Applications 82 (2017) 278–290 281 
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m  onditions, e.g. output-orientated strategy may not be possible for
FIs in isolated area whilst input-orientated strategy may not suit-
ble for MFIs already in inputs shortage. In addition to this, an MFI
ay not be able to just increase its output, e.g. its customer base
as one proxy for the width of outreach), to boost eﬃciency with-
ut simultaneously reducing its input, e.g. operational expenses. 
Thus, we instead employ herein a hyperbolic non-oriented DEA
hat allows for simultaneous scaling of inputs and outputs as per
äre, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994) . This model allows for concur-
ent and equiproportionate reduction of inputs and expansion of
utputs ( Lewis, Mallikarjun, & Sexton, 2013 ). It has been used in
anking sector, e.g. by Holod and Lewis (2011) , and in other sec-
or such as transportation ( Mallikarjun, 2015; Mallikarjun, Lewis, &
exton, 2014 ). As far as we concern, it has not been used in mi-
roﬁnance context hence our contribution. A more advance non-
riented, non-radial DEA model is used in Avkiran (2009) in bank-
ng sector. 
Furthermore, we argue that MFI analysis based on constant re-
urn scale (CRS) is unrealistic as not all MFIs operate at their most
roductive scale size (MPSS). MFI size may hold a crucial factor
n MFI eﬃciency, i.e. comparing small-sized MFIs with large-sized
FIs will therefore be inappropriate. As per Mallikarjun (2015) ,
FI inputs, e.g. operational expense, assets, and employees, in-
reases as its size increases, but some of its outputs may increase
t a decreasing rate, e.g. interest revenue. Variable return to scale
VRS) is thus more appropriate since MFIs are allowed to demon-
trate different returns to scale due to different environment. 
Based on our presumption on regional differences, eﬃciency
s assessed in six regional frontiers separately for homogeneity
nd to obtain regional eﬃciency scores. Clustering method such as
amoilenko and Osei-Bryson (2008) is one alternative to increase
omogeneity, yet due to our intention to present regional-based
nsights we focus on separate regional DEA assessment. Moreover,
ue to unbalanced data available from Microﬁnance Information
xchange (MIX) 1 , we hereby utilise a regional meta-frontier ap-
roach, i.e. all unbalanced MFI data in each region are assessed
ogether against single regional meta-frontier in that respective re-
ion, thus MFI performance in different years are comparable. As
ar as we concern this is the ﬁrst MFI eﬃciency study utilising
egional meta-frontier based on VRS hyperbolic non-oriented DEA
odel in these six regions. 
The hyperbolic non-oriented DEA model can be presented in
he following: 
in θ or max φ
ubject to : 
n ∑ 
j=1 
λ j x i j ≤ θx i 0 , i = 1 , 2 , ..., m ;
n ∑ 
j=1 
λ j y r j ≥ φy r0 , r = 1 , 2 , ..., s ;
n ∑ 
j=1 
λ j = 1 , j = 1 , 2 , ..., n 
j ≥ 0 
= 2 − θ
, φ ≥ 0 
n which x ij and y rj are the i th input of j th DMU and r th output
f j th DMU respectively. θ is the input-minimising eﬃciency for
he particular DMU 0 whilst φ is output-maximising eﬃciency for
his DMU 0 . Constraint φ = 2 − θ is the ﬁrst-order linear approxi-
ation of the constraint θ ∗φ = 1 , i.e. a tangent line to the θ ∗φ =1 Microﬁnance Information Exchange (MIX) is the leading microﬁnance database. 
t obtains its data from contributing MFIs globally, thereafter adjusted and stan- 
ardized to make it uniform and comparable. MIX ranks transparency of MFIs in 
iamond scale from 1 to 5 with 5 diamonds being the most transparent MFIs. 
s  
O  
s  
c  
e  
p   hyperbola at any point. Convexity constraint for λj , 
∑ n 
j=1 λ j = 1 ,
epresents VRS and ensures DMU to be assessed with similarly-
ized DMUs in dataset. 
.2. DEA input–output selection 
Our DEA model uses three inputs and three outputs; three in-
uts represent capital and labour in production, i.e. assets (A), op-
rational expenses (O), and employee (E), whilst one output repre-
ents sustainability, i.e. interest revenue (Ir), and two outputs rep-
esent outreach, i.e. inverse of average loan balance per borrower
ver GNI per capita (I) and borrower (B). Table 1 presents these
long with their deﬁnition from MIX. We modiﬁed the model used
n Widiarto and Emrouznejad (2015) , dropping portfolio at risk 30
ays from input and replacing ﬁnancial revenue from output with
nterest revenue (Ir) the focus herein is on the inﬂuence of differ-
nt loan methodologies to MFI eﬃciency. This includes ‘margin’ or
roﬁt sharing in Islamic microﬁnance charged in lieu of interest. 
Average loan balance per borrower over GNI per capita is used
s in Widiarto and Emrouznejad (2015) as it is a powerful proxy
or the depth of MFI outreach, i.e. smaller loan balance signiﬁes
hat loan is aimed toward the poorest. It is standardised over
NI per capita, thus comparable between countries as purchasing
ower differences are negated. This is used in inverse format to
eﬂect output properties as per Widiarto and Emrouznejad (2015) .
e hereby use total number of borrowers as output representing
readth of outreach as per Nghiem, Coelli, and Rao (2006) and
edzro and Keita (2009) , instead of women borrowers as in most
FI studies such as Aggarwal, Goodell, and Selleck (2015) and
’Espallier, Guérin, and Mersland (2011) , to preserve homogeneity
ince Islamic MFIs in dataset focus on family borrowers instead of
olely women borrowers ( Ahmed, 2002 ). 
.3. DEA model speciﬁcations 
Different input–output speciﬁcations are used in assessing over-
ll, social, and ﬁnancial eﬃciency in Table 2 , with their initials as
nemonic. The overall eﬃciency speciﬁcation is another advantage
f DEA over ratios whereby the latter cannot capture how differ-
nt inputs simultaneously affect multiple outputs in transforma-
ion ( Thanassoulis, 2001 ). 
.4. Tobit regression – second stage analysis 
The second stage analysis herein is to evaluate the relationship
etween regional DEA eﬃciency with loan methods and other eﬃ-
iency determinants, which will also include categorical variables.
he distribution of DEA eﬃciency scores can be referred to as cor-
er solution outcomes as DEA eﬃciency scores are continuous on
nterval [0,1] or [0,100%] and take on the value of 1 or 100% with
ositive probability ( Hoff, 2007 ). There is a concentration of obser-
ations at the maximum values of since no DMU can be assigned
n eﬃciency scores higher than unity ( Chilingerian, 1995 ). 
However, in standard multiple regression the expected errors
f such limited dependent variable will be non-zero thus lead
o biased estimate ( Maddala, 1983 ). Therefore, Tobit regression
 Tobin, 1958 ) is hereby used as it is designed to evaluate relation-
hips between variables wherein the dependent variable is either
ensored or corner solution outcomes, which is limited below (at
inimum value), above (at maximum value), or both. Notwith-
tanding its shortcomings (see e.g. Hoff (2007), Samoilenko and
sei-Bryson (2010) and Chilingerian (1995) for in-depth discus-
ion), Hoff (2007) suggested that it will still be adequate in most
ases to model the relationship of DEA eﬃciency with exogenous
ﬃciency determinants. Tobit regression has been widely used in
ost-DEA analysis in many DEA studies, e.g. in Fethi, Jackson, and
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Table 1 
DEA inputs–outputs. 
Inputs Initial Deﬁnition Usage in literatures Unit 
Assets A Asset needed in transformation process Berger and Humphrey (1997), Bassem (2008), Kipesha 
(2012) and Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) 
USD ’0 0 0 
Operating Expense O Expenses related to operations, e.g. personnel 
expenses, administrative expenses. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2007), Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) , Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009), Hassan and 
Sanchez (2009) and Athanassopoulos (1997) 
USD ’0 0 0 
Employee E Labour input, i.e. all individuals employed by MFI, 
including contract employees or advisor whether or 
not listed on MFI employee roster 
Athanassopoulos (1997), Berger and Humphrey (1997), 
Bassem (2008) , Hassan and Sanchez (2009), Sedzro and 
Keita (2009), Kipesha (2012) , and Haq et al. (2010) 
Numerical 
Outputs Initial Deﬁnition Usage in literatures Unit MFI Objective (Eﬃciency) 
Represented 
Interest Revenue Ir Revenue from loan portfolio, including 
margin rate charged in Islamic 
microﬁnance loan. 
Modiﬁcation from literatures. Many 
literatures, e.g. Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) 
and Hassan and Sanchez (2009) use 
ﬁnancial revenue. 
USD ’0 0 0 Sustainability (Financial 
Eﬃciency) 
Inverse of Average 
Loan Borrower 
I Inverse format of average loan balance per 
MFI borrowers to represent depth of 
outreach ; standardized over gross national 
income (GNI) per capita to remove 
currency & purchasing power parity 
difference. Used in inverse format to have 
characteristic as output 
Modiﬁcation from literatures. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) use average 
loan borrower as index with number of 
borrower. 
% Outreach (Social Eﬃciency) 
Borrowers B The number of individual or entity who 
currently has outstanding loan balance 
with MFIs or is primarily responsible for 
repaying any portion of the Gross Loan 
Portfolio. 
Modiﬁcation from literatures. Most 
literatures use number of women 
borrowers, e.g. Cull et al. (2007) and 
Nghiem et al. (2006) . 
Numerical Outreach (Social Eﬃciency) 
Table 2 
DEA speciﬁcations. 
DEA speciﬁcations (Mnemonic) Eﬃciency speciﬁcations Input variables Outputs variables 
AOE-IrIB Overall eﬃciency • Assets (A) • Interest revenue (Ir) 
• Operating expenses (O) • Inverse of Average loan balance per Borrower over GNI per capita (I) 
• Employees (E) • Number of borrowers (B) 
AOE-Ir Financial eﬃciency • Assets (A) • Interest revenue (Ir) 
• Operating Expenses (O) 
• Employees (E) 
AOE-IB Social eﬃciency • Assets (A) • Inverse of Average loan balance per Borrower over GNI per capita (I) 
• Operating Expenses (O) • Number of borrowers (B) 
• Employees (E) 
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ﬁ  Weyman-Jones (2002), Mallikarjun et al. (2014) Islam, Bäckman,
and Sumelius (2011), Ruggiero and Vitaliano (1999), Wang and
Huang (2007) and Chilingerian (1995) . 
The Tobit regression model utilised herein is as follows: 
T E i = α + β1 Borrowin g i + β2 Borrowin g i 2 
+ β3 Donational l i + β4 Donational l i 2 + β5 CP B i + β6 PAR 30 
+ β7 PAR 90 + β8 Y ieldrea l i + β9 Y ieldrea l i 2 
+ β10 Ind i v id ua l i + β11 Ind i v id ua l i 2 + β12 Grou p i 
+ β13 Grou p i 2 + β14 V il l ag e i + β15 V il l ag e i 2 
+ γ1 GroupDumm y i + γ2 V BankDumm y i 
+ γ3 I ndi v GroupDumm y i + γ4 I ndi v V BankDumm y i 
+ γ5 GroupV BankDumm y i + γ6 Al l MethodDumm y i 
+ γ7 Ban k i + γ8 C UC oo p i + γ9 NBF I i 
+ γ10 Other F or m i + γ11 MF IAg e i + γ12 Regulatio n i 
T E i = 
{ 
T E ∗
i 
if 0 < T E ∗
i 
< 100 
0 if T E i ≤ 0 
100 if T E i ≥ 100 
} 
Three basic loan methods are included in the regression as in-
dependent variables (independent, group, and village) in original
and squared forms and also as six dummy variables for seven
loan method combinations. Inclusion of squared term in several
variables herein is to observe whether curvilinear relationship toﬃciency exists. Additionally, to construct a ranking of loan meth-
ds vis-à-vis eﬃciency in each region, the model includes six
ummy variables for seven loan methods (three basic methods and
our loan combinations with individual loan as base), i.e. to an-
wer the main question of ‘best loan method’ regionally. These two
oints will be the main focus of this study. Seven loan method and
ombinations observed are as follow: 
1. Individual lending 
2. Group lending 
3. Village banking 
4. Combination of individual and group lending 
5. Combination of individual lending and village banking 
6. Combination of group lending and village banking 
7. Combination of all three loan methods 
he rest of the variables included in the Tobit model are explained
n Appendix B . 
. Dataset 
Dataset used is unbalanced annual 2003–2012 MIX data of 1461
MUs from 628 not-for-proﬁt MFIs in 87 countries spread out in
ix regions: Africa, EAP, EECA, LAC, MENA and SA. DMUs in the
ENA region exclude Iran and six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
ountries due to data unavailability. Table 3 presents DMU classi-
cation by loan method for each region. Interestingly, only in SA
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Table 3 
Summary of dataset by loan method. 
Africa East Asia & The Eastern Europe & Latin America & Middle East & South Asia (SA) 
Loan method & combinations Paciﬁc (EAP) Central Asia (EECA) The Caribbean (LAC) North Africa (MENA) 
No of % No of % No of % No of % No of % No of % 
DMU DMU DMU DMU DMU DMU 
Individual Loan 26 14.44 45 27.95 132 65.02 202 36.59 38 30.65 67 27.80 
Group Loan 12 6.67 53 32.92 8 3.94 12 2.17 6 4.84 90 37.34 
Village Banking Loan 11 6.11 0 0.00 1 0.49 15 2.72 0 0.00 30 12.45 
Individual & Group Loan 90 50.00 60 37.27 53 26.11 114 20.65 79 63.71 37 15.35 
Individual & Village Banking Loan 9 5.00 3 1.86 5 2.46 66 11.96 0 0.00 11 4.56 
Group & Village Banking Loan 3 1.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 0.72 0 0.00 5 2.07 
All Methods 29 16.11 0 0.00 4 1.97 139 25.18 1 0.81 1 0.41 
180 10 0.0 0 161 10 0.0 0 203 10 0.0 0 552 10 0.0 0 124 10 0.0 0 241 10 0.0 0 
t  
L  
v  
d  
n  
ﬁ  
u
 
r  
n  
d
X
w  
n  
v
 
f  
e  
M  
Y  
e  
H
 
i  
b  
a  
t
5
m
 
g  
r  
c  
r  
D  
t  
b  
s  
v  
a
 
f  
a  
w  
m  
T  
p  
m  
f
 
o  
7  
n  
c  
w  
s  
p  
c  
M
 
b  
r  
m  
l  
D  
s  
d  
a  
l  
i
 
e  
ﬁ  
f  
o  
a  
I  
g  
i  
l  
m  
E  
c  
i  
l  
(
 
i  
a  
t  
r  
t  
c  
M  
t  
t  
p  hat group lending is still used by majority of DMUs; in EECA and
AC vast majority of DMUs employ individual loan method. Con-
ersely, majority of DMUs for Africa, EAP and MENA offer both in-
ividual and group loan. Thus, group lending is no longer domi-
ates microﬁnance offering as it were in the early growth of micro-
nance. Even in SA, individual lending becomes the second widely-
sed method. 
All monetary data in the dataset are in US Dollar hence compa-
able. As inputs and outputs data have very different scale, mean
ormalization as per Sarkis (2007) is used in DEA analysis, i.e. by
ividing each value in a variable with their mean: 
 Nor m i 0 = X i 0 
[ ( 
N ∑ 
n =1 
X in 
) 
N −1 
] −1 
here X i 0 is value of variable i of observed DMU 0 , N is the total
umber of DMU in sample, and X Nor m i 0 is the mean-normalized
alue of variable i of observed DMU 0 . 
This method is not the only method to standardize the data
or DEA yet this is the widely-used one ( Talluri & Yoon, 20 0 0 ),
.g. used in Gocht and Balcombe (2006), Revilla, Sarkis, and
odrego (2003), Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001) , and Talluri and
oon (20 0 0) . Other methods in data standardization used in
.g. Jahanshahloo, Lotﬁ, Shoja, Tohidi, and Razavyan (2005) and
ashimoto and Kodama (1997) . 
For the second stage analysis, in order to simplify coeﬃcient
nterpretations all independent variables are centred to their mean
y subtracting all observation data by their mean, thus placing zero
t the centre of the data range. Numerical data are represented in
he unit of USD 10 0,0 0 0. 
. First stage analysis: non-oriented hyperbolic DEA – regional 
eta-frontier 
Summary of DEA results is presented in Table 4a . Under re-
ional meta-frontier approach, all DMUs from various years in each
egion are assessed against single regional meta-frontier hence
omparable. Whilst mean overall and ﬁnancial eﬃciency in all
egional meta-frontiers are generally above 60%, with almost all
MUs exhibit ﬁrst quartile (Q1) scores higher than 50%, we ﬁnd
hat the lowest ﬁnancial eﬃciency in Africa, EECA, LAC, and SA to
e below 10% – the lowest being in Africa of 0.24%. These certainly
how very wide gaps between the most- and least-eﬃcient DMUs
is-à-vis sustainability in these regional meta-frontiers albeit on
verage satisfactory. 
In contrast, mean social eﬃciency scores in most regional meta-
rontiers are observed to be below 55% except for EAP (57.74%)
nd MENA (relatively high mean of 63.05%). The gaps are also
ide – the lowest social eﬃciency observed in all but EAP regional
eta-frontier to be below 10% (the lowest being 2.39% in MENA).
hese, plus low Q1 and median scores, suggest a generally poorerformance of DMUs in dataset vis-à-vis outreach, thus a perfor-
ance boost is vital. DMUs exhibiting very poor outreach warrant
urther study. 
Financial eﬃciency is observed to have higher correlation to
verall eﬃciency in all but MENA regional meta-frontier, i.e. above
9% on average. It thus suggests a general tendency toward ﬁ-
ancial objective over social objective amongst DMUs observed,
onﬁrming Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) . The exception is MENA
herein correlation of social eﬃciency to overall eﬃciency is
tronger, i.e. 74.28% vs 55.05%. In this study, overall eﬃciency is
roposed as a measure of overall performance, yet supplemented
losely by ﬁnancial and social eﬃciency measures to understand
FI’s positioning toward its dual objectives. 
Fully-eﬃcient DMUs, i.e. those reaching 100% eﬃciency thus
ecome benchmarks for similarly-sized DMUs in their respective
egional meta-frontiers, consist of DMUs utilising different loan
ethods. We initially expected that DMUs employing mostly used
oan method in a particular region will dominate as benchmark
MUs. As per Tables 3 and 4b , consistent results to this are ob-
erved in EECA, LAC, Africa and MENA. However, DMUs using in-
ividual lending are also found dominating benchmark DMUs in
ll eﬃciency measures in SA and EAP despite domination of other
ending methods therein; it is a counter-intuitive ﬁnding consider-
ng SA is the birthplace of group lending. 
We also presumed based on Cull et al. (2007) , that DMUs
mploying individual loan dominate benchmark for ﬁnancial ef-
ciency, whilst those employing group and village banking loan
or social eﬃciency. Indeed, mostly individual lending DMUs are
bserved as benchmark for ﬁnancial eﬃciency in EECA, LAC, SA,
nd EAP (albeit almost on par with group lending DMUs in EAP).
n MENA and Africa, however, DMUs combining individual and
roup lending dominate as ﬁnancial eﬃciency benchmark. Regard-
ng social eﬃciency, contrary to expectation group lending or vil-
age banking DMUs do not dominate as benchmark in all regional
eta-frontiers; they are on par with individual lending DMUs in
AP and SA. Individual lending DMUs even dominate social eﬃ-
iency benchmark in EECA whilst DMUs using loan combinations
n the rest. These ﬁndings challenge generalisation; group and vil-
age banking MFIs may not always dominate as benchmark DMUs
i.e. best-performing DMUs) for outreach. 
Subsequently, we plot DMU social and ﬁnancial eﬃcency scores
n social-ﬁnancial eﬃciency matrix (SFE matrix) for each region
s proposed by Widiarto and Emrouznejad (2015) . The SFE ma-
rix is divided into four quadrants, i.e. quadrant I in top right
egion for high social – high ﬁnancial eﬃciency region coun-
erclockwise to quadrant IV in bottom right region for high so-
ial – low ﬁnancial eﬃciency. Designed to be user-friendly for
FI stakeholders and to complement overall eﬃciency measure,
his matrix is simple yet informative to monitor DMUs posi-
ioning toward their dual objectives so that performance im-
rovement can be pursued. DMUs in the SFE matrix are then
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Table 4a 
Summary of DEA eﬃciencies. 
Regions DMU Eﬃciencies Mean Min TE score quartiles Correlation with Overall TE 
25% 50% 75% 
Africa 180 Overall TE VRS 72.52 10.34 56.52 72.66 93.42 
Financial TE VRS 67.48 0.24 52.22 67.31 85.39 0.88543 
Social TE VRS 35.75 3.98 12.45 25.85 49.00 0.56532 
East Asia & the Paciﬁc (EAP) 161 Overall TE VRS 80.44 37.85 66.18 82.75 10 0.0 0 
Financial TE VRS 73.86 29.13 61.19 72.55 91.44 0.79761 
Social TE VRS 57.74 10.09 37.86 51.64 77.78 0.68261 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia (EECA) 203 Overall TE VRS 70.01 20.01 55.09 68.09 86.70 
Financial TE VRS 63.62 4.76 48.39 61.18 78.00 0.91118 
Social TE VRS 45.02 4.08 28.31 41.20 60.00 0.69710 
Latin America & the Caribbean (LAC) 552 Overall TE VRS 70.98 8.78 57.47 70.80 84.34 
Financial TE VRS 64.85 7.71 54.45 65.51 77.50 0.79153 
Social TE VRS 43.60 6.09 26.79 36.60 55.71 0.61389 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA) 124 Overall TE VRS 84.26 39.65 74.45 89.10 10 0.0 0 
Financial TE VRS 85.06 32.35 77.19 91.27 97.53 0.55054 
Social TE VRS 63.05 2.39 40.30 64.69 88.09 0.74281 
South Asia (SA) 241 Overall TE VRS 71.44 16.08 59.15 70.73 83.88 
Financial TE VRS 63.63 7.44 50.06 62.15 77.50 0.83958 
Social TE VRS 51.48 8.13 35.96 48.28 64.07 0.72122 
Table 4b 
Summary of fully-eﬃcient benchmark DMUs by loan method. 
Regions DMU Eﬃciencies Fully-eﬃcient DMUs by loan method type a 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Africa 180 Overall TE VRS 36 2 6 – 18 3 – 7 
Financial TE VRS 30 2 3 – 10 2 – 3 
Social TE VRS 14 1 4 – 8 1 – –
East Asia & the Paciﬁc (EAP) 161 Overall TE VRS 41 19 16 – 6 – – –
Financial TE VRS 25 12 11 – 2 – – –
Social TE VRS 28 11 11 – 6 – – –
Eastern Europe & Central Asia (EECA) 203 Overall TE VRS 34 23 2 – 7 – – 2 
Financial TE VRS 23 18 1 – 2 – – 2 
Social TE VRS 14 9 2 – 2 – – 1 
Latin America & the Caribbean (LAC) 552 Overall TE VRS 49 20 5 3 2 9 1 9 
Financial TE VRS 28 18 3 – 2 3 – 2 
Social TE VRS 24 5 3 3 – 8 – 5 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA) 124 Overall TE VRS 36 11 4 – 21 – – –
Financial TE VRS 15 7 – – 8 – – –
Social TE VRS 20 6 4 – 10 – – –
South Asia (SA) 241 Overall TE VRS 29 11 5 7 3 3 – –
Financial TE VRS 17 7 1 3 3 3 – –
Social TE VRS 17 7 3 7 – – – –
a 1 = individual loan; 2 = group loan; 3 = village banking loan; 4 = combination of individual and group loan; 5 = com- 
bination of individual and village banking loan; 6 = combination of group and village banking loan; 7 = combination of 
all loan methods. 
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b  classiﬁed by their loan methods. Based on Cull et al. (2007), Her-
mes and Lensink (2007b) , and Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-
vega, and Rodriguez-meza (20 0 0) , our main hypothesis herein is
that DMUs using solely individual loan to have higher ﬁnancial
eﬃciency whilst DMUs employing solely group or village bank-
ing to have higher social eﬃciency. Yet, in regard to lending com-
binations, we can only establish hypothesis that DMUs combin-
ing all loan methods to have higher ﬁnancial eﬃciency, as per
Hermes et al. (2011) . As overall eﬃciency is found to be highly
correlated to ﬁnancial eﬃciency, we establish equivalent presump-
tion hereto. The ideal quadrant is quadrant I of high social – high
ﬁnancial eﬃciency as DMUs therein able to strive for social and
ﬁnancial eﬃciency concurrently. 
In regional SFE matrices in Fig. 1 , barring MENA regional meta-
frontier, most DMUs are mapped at quadrant II of low social – high
ﬁnancial eﬃciency, including in EAP and SA where DMUs are clus-
tered around the border of quadrant I and II with slightly more
in quadrant II. Whilst these suggest a relatively satisfactory perfor-
mance toward ﬁnancial sustainability, their positions in quadrant IIonetheless signify weak performance vis-à-vis social eﬃciency, or
ediocre at best as in the case of SA where DMUs are mostly at
he border of quadrant I and II. 
This is quite alarming since social eﬃciency is fundamentally
egarded as raison d’être of microﬁnance; it distinguishes MFI
rom traditional ﬁnancial institution – particularly for not-for-proﬁt
FIs. Many African, EECA, LAC and SA DMUs are also mapped at
uadrant III, showing poor performance on both eﬃciencies. In
ontrast, most MENA DMUs are mapped in quadrant I, i.e. a gener-
lly satisfactory performance in both objectives. 
By classifying DMUs based on loan methods, ﬁndings disprove
ur presumption: an absolute generalisation across all regions can-
ot be established regarding loan methods – eﬃciency relation-
hip. For example, many village banking DMUs in Africa and group
ending DMUs in SA are plotted at quadrant II and III (low social
ﬃciency), whilst many individual lending DMUs in African and SA
re mapped at quadrant III (low ﬁnancial and social eﬃciency). 
Intuitively, DMUs employing combination of group or village
anking with individual lending, or those combining all methods
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Fig. 1. Social – ﬁnancial eﬃciency (SFE) matrices for six regional meta-frontiers. 
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h  as per our presumption) should be located in quadrant I, yet em-
irical ﬁndings challenge this notion. 
We therefore cannot conﬁrm generalisation of one loan method
ver another as single best method for microﬁnance globally as
e observe different loan methods/combinations in quadrant I in
ifferent regional meta-frontiers. These necessitate a post-DEA as-
essment to investigate which method generally delivers higher ef-
ciency measures in each region. 
. Second stage analysis: Tobit regression 
In line with study objectives, the analysis will be focused on
he loan methods – eﬃciency relationship, with brief summary on
ndings for other factors. .1. Loan method relationship to eﬃciency 
Results summarised in Table 5 show that individual loan
ethod have signiﬁcant positive linear relationship to ﬁnancial ef-
ciency of not-for-proﬁt MFIs in all but SA regional meta-frontier,
onsistent with initial presumption. It is also consistent with pre-
umption by having signiﬁcant negative linear relationship to so-
ial eﬃciency in African regional meta-frontier, suggesting that in-
reasing individual loan hurts outreach to the poor as individual
oan usually features higher average loan balance and collateral re-
uirement. This correlates with individual lending DMUs’ position-
ng at quadrant II and III in Africa. 
Interestingly, individual loan challenges presumption by pos-
tively correlated with social eﬃciency in EAP and LAC. It also
as convex relationship in MENA and concave relationship in SA,
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Table 5 
Tobit regression coeﬃcients – loan methods. 
Africa EAP EECA 
Overall Financial Social Overall Financial Social Overall Financial Social 
eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency 
Individual 0.0260641 0.0677872 −0.04794 0.2259296 0.188291 0.216551 0.165632 0.126234 0.052824 
[0.352] [0.013] b [0.121] d [0.003] b [0.003] b [0.017] b [0.008] b [0.033] b [0.349] 
Individual squared 0.0 0 0 0116 −0.0 0 0 0236 0.0 0 0 038 −0.0 0 01562 −0.0 0 012 0.0 0 0 038 −0.0 0 016 −0.0 0 011 −0.0 0 0 02 
[0.718] [0.453] [0.264] [0.477] [0.395] [0.898] [0.06] b [0.165] [0.809] 
Group 0.1396255 0.0705433 0.244823 0.0867047 0.046793 0.136408 0.388205 0.339451 0.154028 
[0.013] b [0.158] [0.0 0 0] a [0.086] c [0.331] [0.018] b [0.01] b [0.02] b [0.282] 
Group squared −0.0 0 01099 −0.0 0 0 0454 −0.0 0 024 0.0 0 0 055 0.0 0 0239 −0.0 0 0139 −0.0014 −0.00112 −0.0 0 088 
[0.054] c [0.382] [0.0 0 0] a [0.715] [0.096] c [0.396] [0.064] c [0.13] d [0.235] 
Village 0.7765556 0.4895829 1.180382 −1.769759 −1.06909 −1.017674 2.222186 2.349085 −1.61753 
[0.014] b [0.11] d [0.001] b [0.646] [0.785] [0.826] [0.2] [0.182] [0.292] 
Village squared −0.0058604 −0.0039959 −0.00833 0.0359396 0.022402 0.009818 −0.02895 −0.03605 0.027549 
[0.081] c [0.22] [0.028] b [0.77] [0.858] [0.947] [0.271] [0.178] [0.231] 
Dummy variables for loan methods: 
Group Loan 18.18123 4.013998 36.10391 −0.4414859 3.010 0 04 4.106721 3.438791 −1.30637 12.07702 
[0.025] b [0.594] [0.0 0 0] a [0.922] [0.5] [0.44] [0.735] [0.895] [0.227] 
Village Banking Loan −23.34147 −17.80987 −26.5259 3896.536 4993.236 −3821.57 
[0.007] b [0.038] b [0.008] b [0.282] [0.175] [0.227] 
Individual & Group Loan Combi 2.843853 4.332787 −0.74168 −6.468379 −5.16581 −4.850714 −0.31182 −4.94101 6.29806 
[0.542] [0.348] [0.891] [0.159] [0.256] [0.371] [0.953] [0.346] [0.231] 
Individual & Village Banking Combi −14.58848 −15.45832 −14.8032 21.67201 17.838 15.84514 −32.6561 −30.4489 16.77099 
[0.141] d [0.11] d [0.189] [0.231] [0.332] [0.466] [0.232] [0.27] [0.505] 
Group & Village Banking Combi −32.31518 −29.06026 −30.6792 
[0.013] b [0.025] b [0.043] b 
All Loan Method Combi −8.891292 −3.519451 −15.8096 13.16755 24.99871 7.518227 
[0.179] [0.588] [0.038] b [0.346] [0.072] c [0.57] 
LAC MENA SA 
Overall Financial Social Overall Financial Social Overall Financial Social 
eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency 
Individual 0.0122647 0.0079981 0.009261 0.078719 0.065148 −0.012761 0.0228186 0.013823 0.040286 
[0.008] b [0.109] c [0.046] b [0.007] b [0.04] b [0.755] [0.185] [0.435] [0.042] b 
Individual squared −0.0 0 0 0 011 −0.0 0 0 0 0 07 −0.0 0 0 0 01 0.0 0 0 0 07 −0.0 0 0 052 0.0 0 0159 −0.0 0 0 0 033 −0.0 0 0 0 02 −0.0 0 0 0 06 
[0.152] [0.447] [0.165] [0.856] [0.17] [0.011] b [0.293] [0.614] [0.084] c 
Group 0.2309385 0.1049335 0.265827 0.082364 0.098466 0.08434 0.0506859 0.037761 0.083095 
[0.002] b [0.193] [0.001] b [0.022] b [0.019] b [0.081] c [0.079] c [0.203] [0.014] b 
Group squared −0.0 0 0926 −0.0 0 0503 −0.0 0 099 −0.0 0 0 031 −0.0 0 0 02 −0.0 0 0 0 07 −0.0 0 0 0286 −0.0 0 0 035 −0.0 0 0 042 
[0.002] b [0.114] d [0.002] b [0.368] [0.648] [0.88] [0.294] [0.197] [0.206] 
Village 0.190626 0.0634907 0.407591 0.1743589 0.200972 0.140846 
[0.0 0 0] a [0.151] [0.0 0 0] a [0.002] b [0.0 0 0] a [0.021] b 
Village squared −0.0 0 0383 −0.0 0 0122 −0.0 0 076 −0.0 0 01595 −0.0 0 0196 −0.0 0 0119 
[0.001] b [0.326] [0.0 0 0] a [0.012] b [0.003] b [0.098] c 
Dummy variables for loan methods: 
Group Loan 6.980715 9.817253 17.55719 23.84905 −43.14635 45.35036 −5.533652 −0.65404 −17.9451 
[0.172] [0.068] c [0.001] b [0.024] b [0.0 0 0] a [0.002] b [0.143] d [0.866] [0.0 0 0] a 
Village Banking Loan 8.496272 −12.88655 23.76816 −6.8842 −8.42608 −7.28234 
[0.065] c [0.008] b [0.0 0 0] a [0.191] [0.119] d [0.235] 
Individual & Group Loan Combi −12.30319 −13.68065 −6.04798 1.897782 0.5303064 4.702107 −9.834916 −3.93544 −21.6142 
[0.0 0 0] a [0.0 0 0] a [0.007] b [0.686] [0.919] [0.469] [0.03] b [0.397] [0.0 0 0] a 
Individual & Village Banking Combi −4.041484 −7.972095 0.156735 −0.1748342 −7.72025 −11.0435 
[0.121] d [0.004] b [0.955] [0.978] [0.245] [0.14] d 
Group & Village Banking Combi −1.976478 −11.63971 2.611017 −16.29915 −13.1766 −23.025 
[0.82] [0.196] [0.772] [0.048] b [0.123] d [0.019] b 
All Loan Method Combi −5.855726 −7.3241 −2.51834 −31.00332 −27.38276 −3.83288 −20.18322 −10.7535 −22.414 
[0.007] b [0.002] b [0.278] [0.31] [0.371] [0.896] [0.247] [0.552] [0.278] 
a Signiﬁcant at 99.99% conﬁdence interval. 
b Signiﬁcant at 95% conﬁdence interval. 
c Signiﬁcant at 90% conﬁdence interval. 
d Signiﬁcant at 85% conﬁdence interval. 
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c  though the latter with very small coeﬃcient. Convex relationship
in MENA suggests that extending individual loan up to certain
amount may reduce social eﬃciency scores, but it will start to
rise beyond that amount. Due to the social eﬃciency speciﬁca-
tion used, if an MFI extend/increase offering of individual loan
its social eﬃciency decreases due to shift in focus from poor-
est to better-off borrower with higher loan balance (less depth ofutreach), i.e. mission drift, up to a point beyond which individ-
al loan takes over as major method for MFI, and breadth of out-
each, i.e. number of borrowers, starts to offset the effect of de-
lining depth and increases its social eﬃciency scores. In our re-
ult for MENA, keeping other variables at their means, this crit-
cal amount is USD 19 million. Concave relationship in SA on the
ontrary suggests that extending/increasing individual loan offering
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S  ncreases outreach due to breadth of outreach offsetting depth up
o a point beyond which outreach breadth will eventually decrease
s MFIs may vet for more quality clients, as per Cull et al. (2007) .
owever, due to its very small concavity in Table 5 , the graphical
epiction will almost be identical to a linear positive relationship. 
Regarding overall eﬃciency, individual loan as expected exhibits
igniﬁcant positive relationship in EAP and MENA regional meta-
rontiers. It also shows signiﬁcant and marginally signiﬁcant con-
ave relationships in EECA and LAC regional meta-frontiers, respec-
ively. 
Contrary to presumption, group loan shows signiﬁcant positive
inear relationship to ﬁnancial eﬃciency in Africa and MENA re-
ional meta-frontiers, whilst exhibits convex relationship in EAP
egional meta-frontier and concave relationship in EECA and LAC
egional meta-frontiers. Concave relationship in these two regions
uggests that offering group loan increases ﬁnancial eﬃciency but
p to a certain amount, beyond which it decreases due to higher
ransaction costs associated with managing group loans as stated
n many literatures, e.g. Conning and Morduch (2011) . With other
ariables constant at means, ﬁnancial eﬃciency start to decrease
fter group loan reaching approximately USD 30 million and USD
2 million in EECA and LAC regional meta-frontiers, respectively.
n EAP regional meta-frontier, convex relationship is exhibited
hereby offering group loan initially reduces ﬁnancial eﬃciency
ue to transaction costs entails until it reaches USD 7.5 million,
eyond which ﬁnancial eﬃciency starts to increase since interest
evenue starts to offset transaction costs. 
Against overall eﬃciency, group loan exhibits contrary ﬁndings
o presumption with positive linear relationship in EAP, MENA, and
A regional meta-frontiers and concave relationship in EECA, LAC,
nd African regional meta-frontiers; the latter with very small con-
avity. Its concave relationship in EECA and LAC suggests that over-
ll eﬃciency starts to fall after reaching USD 28 million and USD
2 million, respectively; almost identical to its relationship to ﬁ-
ancial eﬃciency due its close correlation. 
Consistent with presumption, group loan exhibits signiﬁcant
ositive linear relationship with social eﬃciency in EAP, MENA, and
A regional meta-frontiers. Our model shows that concave rela-
ionships are observed in African and LAC regional meta-frontiers,
ndicating that maximum amounts exist for group loan beyond
hich social eﬃciency starts to fall. From the model, group loan
arger than USD 14 million in LAC region will start reducing the so-
ial eﬃciency, whilst very small concavity in African region means
hat increasing/offering group loan increases social eﬃciency until
oughly USD 68 million before it start to decrease. These ﬁndings
re consistent with presumption for these two regions yet up to
 point. There are many reasons that may cause this that warrant
urther regional investigation. 
Village banking method challenges presumption regarding ﬁ-
ancial eﬃciency by exhibiting signiﬁcant positive linear relation-
hip in African and LAC and concave relationship in SA regions. Our
nding in SA shows that, due to its very small concavity, ﬁnancial
ﬃciency increases by offering village banking loan until USD 83
illion then decreases thereafter. This may be due to the higher
ransaction costs in managing village banking MFIs, as suggested
n studies e.g. Westley (2004). Village banking also challenges pre-
umption regarding overall eﬃciency by exhibiting signiﬁcant con-
ave relationships in abovementioned three regions, i.e. offering
illage banking loan increases overall eﬃciency albeit until some
aximum amounts therein. Other variables constant at means, this
odel suggests a maximum amount of USD 10.5 million in Africa,
SD 28 million in LAC and USD 94 million in SA before overall eﬃ-
iency starts to plummet. It also has concave relationship to social
ﬃciency in these three regions, consistent to presumption albeit
imited to maximum amounts. Maximum amount before social ef-
ciency begins to fall are USD 7.5 million, USD 31 million, and USD2 million in African, LAC, and MENA frontiers, respectively. These
ast results may be an indirect effect of village banking’s high costs,
et it needs thorough regional study. 
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that offering/increasing group loan in
ENA and also group and village banking loan combination in
frica enables non-proﬁt DMUs in dataset to increase ﬁnancial
ﬃciency faster than individual loan, with village banking loan
ncreases ﬁnancial eﬃciency the fastest amongst the three basic
ethods. Similarly, we also ﬁnd offering group loan in EECA un-
il USD 12 million assists small-scale DMUs to increase ﬁnancial
ﬃciency, before plummetting thereafter. On the contrary, we ob-
erved that offering/increasing individual loan in EAP region helps
on-proﬁt DMUs in dataset to increase social eﬃciency faster than
roup loan due to number of borrowers reached (breadth of out-
each). These ﬁndings support our argument that loan method im-
act is not clear cut to all regions due to regional differences. 
.2. Loan method ranking 
As presented in Appendix B and Table 6 , ﬁndings from dummy
ariables for seven loan combinations show that different loan
ethods top the ranks in different regions, i.e. there is no sin-
le method that has ultimate advantage in all regions or in any
ﬃciency speciﬁcation. Indeed, group lending comes out ﬁrst in
verall and social eﬃciency in African and MENA regional meta-
rontiers and also in ﬁnancial eﬃciency in LAC regional meta-
rontiers, but it is village banking loan in the latter region that tops
he overall and social eﬃciency. Group loan also sits ﬁrst in differ-
nt eﬃciency in different regions but not single-handedly; it is on
ar with other methods in top position due to insigniﬁcant differ-
nces with other methods in the same position. For instance, group
oan is on par with individual loan, loan combination 4 (combina-
ion of individual and group loan) and loan combination 7 (com-
ination of all loan methods) in ﬁnancial eﬃciency in African re-
ional meta-frontier. Conversely, for ﬁnancial and social eﬃciency
n EAP and also for overall and social eﬃciency in EECA, we cannot
nd signiﬁcant differences between different loan methods. 
Equally, we observe that individual loan do not top the rank in
nancial or other eﬃciency in any region by itself. It ranks ﬁrst
n ﬁnancial eﬃciency in African, MENA, and SA regional meta-
rontiers and also in overall and social eﬃciency in SA regional
eta-frontier, but it ties with several loan methods/combinations
ue to insigniﬁcant differences thereto. 
Thus, in our dataset of not-for-proﬁt MFIs we can only conﬁrm
ith notion of best loan method in regional context, not globally.
e indeed observe group lending as best method of microﬁnance
s in Ahmed (2002) in terms of overall and social eﬃciency, yet
nly in African and MENA regional meta-frontiers. Similarly, we
annot conﬁrm Cull et al. (2007) suggesting individual lending as
est method in ﬁnancial eﬃciency as group lending prevails in LAC
egional meta-frontier and group loan is on par with individual
oan and other combination methods in African, EAP, and SA re-
ional meta-frontiers. 
We can conﬁrm Westley (2004) and Hiatt and Wood-
orth (2006) in the scope of LAC that village banking is relatively
est method in terms of overall and social eﬃciency. 
There are no signiﬁcant performance differences amongst all
even loan methods in EAP vis-à-vis ﬁnancial and social eﬃ-
iency, albeit group, individual lending and combination of indi-
idual and village banking loan top the overall eﬃciency. No sig-
iﬁcant differences amongst methods also observed in overall and
ocial eﬃciency in EECA regional meta-frontier, although combi-
ation of all three methods came ﬁrst in ﬁnancial eﬃciency, con-
rming Hermes et al. (2011) . Interestingly, group lending is not
isted in the top ranks for overall, ﬁnancial and social eﬃciency in
A regional meta-frontiers, whilst individual lending is one of the
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Table 6 
Loan method ranking – six regional meta-frontiers. 
Rank Africa EAP EECA 
Overall Financial Social Overall Financial Social Overall Financial Social 
eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency 
1 Group Loan Group Loan 
Individual Loan 
Loan Combo 4 
Loan Combo 7 
Group Loan Group Loan 
Individual Loan 
Loan Combo 5 
No signiﬁcant 
differences 
between methods 
No signiﬁcant 
differences 
between methods 
No signiﬁcant 
differences 
between methods 
Loan Combo 7 No signiﬁcant 
differences 
between methods 
2 Individual Loan 
Loan Combo 4 
Loan Combo 7 
Loan Combo 5 Individual Loan 
Loan Combo 4 
Loan Combo 5 
Loan Combo 4 Group Loan 
Individual Loan 
Village Banking 
Loan 
Loan Combo 4 
Loan Combo 5 
3 Loan Combo 5 Village Banking 
Loan 
Loan Combo 7 
4 Village Banking 
Loan 
Loan Combo 6 Village Banking 
Loan 
5 Loan Combo 6 Loan Combo 6 
Rank LAC MENA SA 
Overall Financial Social Overall Financial Social Overall Financial Social 
eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency eﬃciency 
1 Village Banking 
Loan 
Group Loan Village Banking 
Loan 
Group Loan Individual Loan 
Loan Combo 4 
Loan Combo 7 
Group Loan Individual Loan 
Village Banking 
Loan 
Loan Combo 5 
Loan Combo 7 
Individual Loan 
Group Loan 
Loan Combo 4 
Loan Combo 5 
Loan combo 7 
Individual Loan 
Village Banking 
Loan 
Loan Combo 7 
2 Individual Loan 
Group Loan 
Loan Combo 4 
Loan Combo 5 
Loan Combo 6 
Loan Combo 7 
Individual Loan 
Loan Combo 6 
Group Loan Individual Loan 
Loan Combo 4 
Loan Combo 7 
Group Loan Individual Loan 
Loan Combo 4 
Loan Combo 7 
Group Loan Village Banking 
Loan 
Loan Combo 5 
3 Loan Combo 7 Individual Loan 
Loan Combo 5 
Loan Combo 6 
Loan Combo 7 
Loan Combo 4 Loan Combo 6 Group Loan 
4 Loan Combo 5 Loan Combo 4 Loan Combo 6 Loan Combo 4 
5 Village Banking 
Loan 
Loan Combo 6 
6 Loan Combo 3 
Loan Combo 4: Combination of Individual and Group Loan. 
Loan Combo 5: Combination of Individual and Village Banking Loan. 
Loan Combo 6: Combination of Group and Village Banking Loan. 
Loan Combo 7: Combination of all loan method. 
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p  methods topping the rank for all these eﬃciency measures. This
is a counter-intuitive result considering SA as birthplace of group
lending. Conversely, village banking is also listed herein amongst
methods providing best performance in overall and social eﬃ-
ciency. 
6.3. Other factors in Tobit model to eﬃciency 
From Appendix C , we ﬁnd contrary to our presumption that
borrowings and total donations (sum of cash and equity dona-
tions) do not always have linear positive relationship to eﬃciency.
Borrowings exert negative relationship with overall eﬃciency in
EAP and MENA and with social eﬃciency in MENA. Concave re-
lationship is observed in Africa and MENA where borrowings con-
tribute positively to eﬃciency but up to a point. Similarly for to-
tal donations; ﬁndings in some regions show concave relationship
where total donations help eﬃciency to certain amount; or con-
vexity showing minimum total donations amount is needed before
it can assist eﬃciency. However, ﬁndings on total donation are con-
tingent to our DEA speciﬁcation for ﬁnancial eﬃciency with inter-
est revenue as sole output representing sustainability. 
Interest rate does not simply correlate positively to ﬁnancial
eﬃciency in all frontiers as intuitively suggested; indeed positive
relationships are found in LAC and MENA whilst convex relation-
ship is observed in EAP. Interestingly, convex relationship to social
eﬃciency is found in almost all frontiers, i.e. social eﬃciency isecreasing along with interest rate hike until reaching a rate be-
ond which social eﬃciency is starting to increase again. One pos-
ible explanation is that high interest rates part correlates with
roup and village banking lending; whilst rising interest rates in
ndividual lending reduce breadth of outreach. Regarding legal for-
at, MFI age, and MFI regulation, generalisation cannot be estab-
ished amongst not-for-proﬁt MFIs for all frontiers. 
. Conclusions and direction for future research 
Based on our ﬁndings, we conclude that the concept of “best
oan method” for not-for-proﬁt MFIs cannot be generalised for all
rontiers. Instead, empirical evidence shows that different frontiers
ay have different preferences due to different environment. It
lso shows that several loan methods and method combinations
an exhibit equivalent performance in different frontiers. As an ex-
mple, group lending is the best method in achieving highest over-
ll and social eﬃciency in Africa and MENA, yet it is village bank-
ng that prevails in these eﬃciency measures in LAC. We also ﬁnd
hat three basic loan methods of individual loan, group loan, and
illage banking loan exert different relationship to eﬃciency in dif-
erent regional meta-frontiers. In addition to linear relationship,
urvilinear relationships are also observed in some regions, both
onvex and concave. These show that loan method – eﬃciency re-
ationships are not as straightforward as may intuitively suggested
rom literatures. Based on ﬁndings, the optimum loan amount
roviding higher eﬃciency for these three basic methods can be
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H  alculated for each region. This can serve as recommendation to
FIs in constructing their loan strategy. 
Not-for-proﬁt DMUs in all regions in this study show generally
atisfactory ﬁnancial eﬃciency scores. However, in terms of social
ﬃciency most DMUs in all but MENA regional meta-frontier are
ound to perform less satisfactorily, i.e. achieving average scores of
ess than 50%. Since outputs representing social eﬃciency resem-
le depth and breadth of outreach, this should serve as a wake-
p call for MFIs and regulators in improving MFIs performance in
erms of outreach to the poor. Overall eﬃciency is generally found
o be closely related to ﬁnancial eﬃciency in all but MENA regional
eta-frontier. Thus, using overall eﬃciency as general performance
enchmark can only be used cautiously; it must be augmented by
nancial and social eﬃciency scores to provide better pictures. 
From results presented in Appendix C and mentioned brieﬂy
n the previous section, our ﬁndings on other factors related to
ﬃciencies, i.e. borrowings, total donation, CPB, PAR 30, PAR 90,
nterest rates, MFI age, regulation status, and legal format, support
ur argument that appropriate performance analysis should best
e done on regional basis separately as we ﬁnd different results
or different region. 
Finally, we propose that future microﬁnance eﬃciency study to
xplore eﬃciency determinants to be performed in regional basis
lobally as it may provide more useful insights. Qualitative ﬁeld
tudy is also recommended to complement or to support quantita-
ive analysis as it enhances the understanding of analysis results. 
Further classiﬁcations of DMU based on second stage variables
nd graphical depictions of loan methods – eﬃciency relationships
re available from authors. 
upplementary materials 
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found,
n the online version, at 10.1016/j.eswa.2017.03.022 . 
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